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Double Moral Hazard and the Energy Efficiency Gap 
Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet1, Sébastien Houde2 
 
Submission for the Winter issue of the IAEE ‘Energy Forum’ newsletter, which will focus on energy 
efficiency.  
Abstract (23 words) 
Moral hazard issues can deter profitable investments in energy efficiency. Energy-savings insurance 
and quality standards can mitigate the problem – yet not eliminate it. 
Article (1719 words) 
 
Are we missing opportunities for profitable investments in energy efficiency? As Adam Jaffe and 
Robert Stavins made clear in an influential paper in 1994, the answer could very well be ‘yes,’ 
provided that one can prove such investments are subject to market failures. Since then, economic 
analysis has sought to identify and quantify market failures that induce an ‘energy efficiency gap,’ 
i.e., a suboptimal level of energy efficiency investment. 
In an ongoing project, we contribute to this line of research by examining information asymmetries, a 
classic market failure that has received little attention in the energy efficiency literature. This article 
summarizes early results, focusing on moral hazard issues and policy solutions to address them. It 
takes a broad perspective in which interactions between moral hazard and other market failures, 
such as environmental externalities, as well as other market barriers to energy efficiency (e.g., 
consumer heterogeneity) are taken into account.  
How moral hazard can affect energy efficiency decisions 
Moral hazard problems arise when one or several contracting parties take actions that are not fully 
observable to the others, but impact the final outcomes of the transaction. Such a situation is 
common in the context of energy retrofits for buildings. Our first result shows that when the actions 
of the contractors (i.e., installers of energy-saving technologies) are not fully observable, contractors 
will underprovide quality, and opportunities for further energy savings will be left untapped. 
Consider a homeowner willing to insulate the walls in her house. She might be motivated by reducing 
her heating bill and, perhaps, by  ancillary attributes unrelated to energy, such as cosmetic makeover 
or acoustic absorption. Suppose that the homeowner cannot perfectly observe the energy saving 
performance of the job completed by the contractor. That is, she does not have the technical skills to 
judge whether the insulation panels have been properly connected, although she is aware that any 
such defect will deter the thermal performance of the installation. Anticipating that the contractor is 
aware of her limitations, she will expect him to save on installation costs and perform the job poorly. 
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Any claim that he will provide the highest quality, enabling her to maximize energy savings, will be 
considered ‘cheap talk’ by the homeowner.  We show that the contractor will not deviate from these 
expectations and indeed complete the lowest possible quality job. Absent policy intervention, quality 
will not be contractible and thus underprovided. This conclusion holds irrespective of the structure of 
the market, from a competitive industry with free entry, which is the most likely case (Zabin et al., 
2011), to a monopolistic industry. 
Were energy performance perfectly observable, the homeowner would demand the level of 
installation quality that reduces her marginal energy expenditure up to the marginal benefit she 
derives from space heating. Outside this condition, the contractor does not internalize the benefits 
his actions provide to the homeowner and a wedge arises between social and private surplus. The 
wedge gets larger if, in addition to the moral hazard, one considers the environmental externalities 
associated with energy consumption. 
Such quality problems might be substantial and affect any energy end-use technology for which 
installation is a significant input, such as HVAC systems or window replacements. As of 2008, only 
15% of central air conditioning installations in existing dwellings met satisfactory quality 
specifications in California (Messenger, 2008). In the commercial sector, where retrofit projects are 
deployed over a large scale, the gap can be sizeable. Overall, the energy savings that would thereby 
remain untapped could be around two quadrillion end-use BTUs. This is a lower bound of the 
contribution of building shell and HVAC system improvement in existing buildings to the technical 
potential for energy efficiency in the U.S. by 2020, as assessed by McKinsey&Co. (2009). 
Government intervention: Conditions, instruments and efficiency 
A natural conclusion to the demonstration that the moral hazard induces an energy efficiency gap is 
that some government intervention is justified. We show, contrary to normal intuition, that 
addressing a moral hazard might not always be warranted in a world with large environmental 
externalities. 
Internalizing environmental externalities is always desirable, regardless of whether or not the 
contracting parties overcome the moral hazard. Social welfare cannot be maximized as long as the 
parties do not account for the broader externalities produced by their actions. However, the 
reciprocal is not necessarily true: If environmental externalities are not (or cannot be) internalized, 
then it might be desirable to maintain, rather than undo, the moral hazard. Though unlikely, this can 
actually occur if the ‘rebound effect’ (i.e. the elasticity of the demand for energy service with respect 
to energy efficiency) is beyond a certain level, which can be derived analytically. In this case, if solving 
the moral hazard leads to noticeable improvements in energy efficiency, then energy consumption 
could actually increase. As a result, environmental externalities would be larger. 
Notwithstanding this extreme and rare ‘backfire’ situation, we can consider that environmental 
externalities are internalized through energy price, so that we only need to worry about the moral 
hazard. Now, what policy instrument can fix it? 
A social planner would like to get the contractor to provide the optimal level of quality and the 
homeowner to consume the optimal quantity of energy service. This could be achieved by a quality 
standard forcing the contractor to offer the level of quality that is optimal to a representative 
consumer. Yet such an instrument suffers from the classic criticism that it abstracts from 
heterogeneity in consumer valuation of energy service. Take, for instance, an owner who visits her 
vacation home infrequently, thus consuming little heat there. The price of a high quality retrofit to 
save energy would be in excess of what is optimal to her. Now if the stringency of the standard is 
below what would be optimal to the consumer, as long as performance remains unobservable to her, 
the contractor will not offer more than the standard. 
Besides regulatory instruments, one might think of incentive-based mechanisms. Energy-savings 
insurance, whereby the contractor bears a share of the consumer’s energy bill (perhaps above a 
certain threshold), is one example. Such a contract, however, is subject to a second moral hazard: 
Lowering the marginal energy expenditure to the consumer decreases her marginal benefit. She may 
increase her consumption of energy service by setting her thermostat to a higher temperature, 
knowing that the contractor will have to pay some of the cost. The contractor would provide optimal 
quality if he fully insured the savings to minimize insurance payouts, but energy service would be 
consumed optimally by the consumer were she not insured. As a result, the only insurance that can 
be sustained in equilibrium features incomplete coverage and only brings about a second-best 
outcome. 
In the end, in such context where both parties can take hidden actions, the only way to bring about 
the first-best outcome is to involve a perfectly informed third-party (perhaps with the help of a smart 
meter). This is very unlikely to be implemented, however, as it would incur prohibitive transaction 
costs. 
The instruments described are already available in the marketplace. Various types of quality 
certifications exist, most notably those provided by the Building Performance Institute (BPI) and the 
Residential Energy Services Network (RESNET). Likewise, energy-savings insurance has been present 
in the commercial sector for about twenty years (Mills, 2003), and has started to appear in the 
residential sector (see for instance Green Homes America). As normative analysis just showed, these 
instruments cannot fully establish economic efficiency. This does not mean, however, that they 
cannot improve welfare. 
Assigning numbers: Size of the gap and policy effectiveness 
To get a sense of the magnitude of the problems studied, we have developed an analytical model of 
insulation sales that is calibrated to the U.S. market. Numerical assumptions are detailed in Box 1. 
BOX 1 
We find that social welfare (measured as the sum of consumer’s utility and firm’s profit) derived 
from space heating consumption could be doubled, were both moral hazard and energy externalities 
fixed. Simply undoing the moral hazard closes about two-thirds of the gap. The results are displayed 
in Figure 1 in a Jaffe & Stavins-like ‘energy efficiency gap diagram’ (welfare vs. energy efficiency), as 
well as in an ‘energy gap diagram’ (welfare vs. energy consumption). 
FIGURE 1 
When it comes to policy instruments, quality standards of different stringencies (each based on what 
would be optimal for one specific representative consumer) will yield different welfare 
improvements. Yet one level could bring society remarkably close to the first-best outcome. 
Comparatively, energy-savings insurance achieves lower welfare gains on average. Still, those can be 
non-negligible in absolute value, amounting to 15% of the welfare enjoyed in the laissez-faire 
situation. This is achieved through optimal insurance coverage as low as 13% on average. These 
results are displayed in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2 
Conclusions 
Our analysis suggests that moral hazard can induce a significant energy efficiency gap. This insight is 
relatively new. Most of the literature has concluded that it was hard to find market failure 
explanations for the abnormally high implicit discount rates observed in energy efficiency decisions, 
which can be seen as a manifestation of the energy efficiency gap (Gillingham et al., 2009; Allcott and 
Greenstone, 2012). While these studies have focused on the role of possible undervaluation of 
energy efficiency by consumers, ours underlines that the behavior of the firms should not be 
excluded from the analysis. 
In terms of policies to address moral hazard, we show that the first-best outcome can only be 
attained to the extent that energy performance can be made perfectly observable. Since no 
technology can meet that goal, government intervention will only generate a second-best outcome, 
even though it can get very close to the first-best. Our numerical simulations suggest that the various 
types of quality certifications already implemented may be worthwhile, although more empirical 
support is needed to determine whether they are set at satisfactory stringency levels and what 
administrative costs they incur. Energy-savings insurance may not perform as well as quality 
standards. Still, even with modest coverage insurance products could deliver welfare gains that 
should not be disregarded. This is perhaps itself a paradox that firms in constant search of new 
marketing strategies have not relied more heavily on such schemes. 
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BOX 1 
A homeowner of median income is assumed to live in a house of average size. She consumes natural gas for 
space heating with a price-elasticity of -0.8 and responds to energy efficiency improvements with a 20% 
rebound effect (which is below the ‘problematic’ range mentioned in the text). When considering an insulation 
project, she discounts future energy expenditures over ten years (which is close to the duration of either 
average house occupancy or energy-savings insurance contracts), at a 7% discount rate and using a constant 
natural gas price of $12 per thousand cubic feet. She contracts with an insulation contractor who allocates 
three installers a day. Job completion takes at least one full day. At this input level, job is sold $2,400 and 
expected energy savings are 5%. Performance increases as installers work longer and mobilize higher skills, up 
to 25% for three-day operation. Workers are paid $5 an hour at the end of the first day and wages escalate to 
$30 at the end of the third day. From a social perspective, it is assumed that energy consumption produces, 
over 30 years (which is the physical lifetime of energy efficiency investments), CO2 emissions that cause 
damages worth $30/tCO2 in constant annual present value. 
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